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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This brief replies to the matters raised in the Tax 
Commission brief. The format is that of plaintiff's earlier 
brief, except that a new Point 3 has been added as to 
matters presented here by the Commission for the first 
time. In the discussion which follows, both taxpayers, The 
Midland Telephone Company and Utah Telephone Com-
pany, are for brevity and convenience referred to to-
gether as "Midland." 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Tax Commission's description of the process by 
which Midland's federal tax was computed suggests an 
overall impression that the first step is the combining by 
the parent of the subsidiaries' incomes and expenses into 
a consolidated income figure, and that Midland's sepa-
rate taxable income is thereafter artificially computed. 
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Any such impression is incorrect. The Commission's brief 
says (p. 2) that some of Midland's deductions are ex-
cluded initially and deducted after the consolidation. The 
brief then states (see step (c), p. 2) that "allegedly" 
each member "then" prepares its own separate, "recom-
puted" tax liability. The words in quotation marks are 
added in the Commission's brief and do not appear in 
the agreed statement (R 8). 
In fact, the process operates in the reverse order and 
is the opposite in substance. Midland's separate compu-
tation of its federal tax is the basic, first step (Tr. 30, 32). 
It is that tax which Midland actually pays to the In-
ternal Revenue Service. The items supposedly excluded 
from the first step are in fact included and deducted in 
the initial computation. The Midland witness testified, 
referring to contributions as an example of such a de-
duction (Tr. 32) : "But it does not mean by any stretch 
of the imagination that that company does not get to 
deduct its contributions, it does so." Confusion about the 
so-called excluded items appears initially in the record 
(cf. fl7(a) with fl7(c); R 8), since such items must also 
be kept account of for another purpose, that of assuring 
that the deduction of these items does not exceed an 
overall limitation imposed upon the federal consolidated 
return. The quoted testimony was later submitted to clar-
ify the process. 
The point of the foregoing is this: the computation 
process that all Continental subsidiaries (including Mid-
land) must follow is the separate-company procedure. 
This fact is basic to this case. As the Midland witness 
stated (Tr. 34): 
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"And because of one thing, our closing agreement 
with the Internal Revenue Service which does 
not give us an option of doing it any way other 
than on a separate company basis and two, the 
various and sundry public utility commissions 
which also do not give us an option of how we 
account for these things, we use a separate com-
pany calculation." 
The single legal problem of this litigation emerges 
from these central facts, testified to and uncontradicted: 
Midland first computes its federal taxes separately (Tr. 
31, 32). It delivers that tax, by a transfer of actual funds, 
to its parent. Midland's parent is its sole agent for federal 
taxation purposes. The parent prepares and files the 
consolidated return of the entire Continental system and 
sends in the indicated consolidated tax. If a subsidiary 
incurs a loss, and if that loss lessens consolidated income, 
the loss subsidiary gets a refund from Continental in the 
amount of the tax effect of its loss (R 35). Such refund 
would be the same had that subsidiary filed its federal 
return separately (R 36). Neither Midland, nor the Con-
tinental system as a system, pays a greater or lesser or 
different federal tax over the long run by reason of the 
system's choice of filing a federal consolidated return 
(R 44-45). 
The Utah corporation franchise tax return of Mid-
land is filed by it directly and separately. The taxes-paid 
deduction taken by Midland in that computation is Mid-
land's separately computed and actually paid federal tax. 
The Tax Commission's assignment method is de-
scribed at pp. 4-5 of its brief. That theory would limit 
Midland's allowable deduction to a figure arrived at 
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by determining the ratio that Midland's income bears to 
the incomes of all the profit-making subsidiaries, multi-
plied by the federal tax of the consolidated group. The 
practical effect is seen most clearly in a simplified 
example: 
Assume that the Continental system consists of 
three operating utility subsidiaries: Midland, hav-
ing income of $1,000 from Utah operations; a 
Montana corporation, having income of $1,000 
from Montana; and an Alaska corporation, having 
a $1,000 loss upon Alaska operations. Assume a 
50% federal tax rate. 
The federal tax result would be: Midland 
would remit its separate-company tax of $500 to 
the parent. Montana would remit a $500 tax to 
the parent. On the consolidated income of $1,000 
($1,000 plus $1,000 minus $1,000) the consoli-
dated tax is $500. Alaska would receive a $500 
tax refund from the parent. The parent's books 
would net out at zero. 
As to the Utah franchise tax, on these facts, 
the Commission's assignment theory would allow 
Midland a deduction of $250 on its Utah franchise 
tax return. The deduction would be computed as 
the ratio of Midland's income to the incomes of 
Midland and Montana, multiplied by the consoli-
dated tax (1,000 -f- 2,000 x 500 = 250). 
The Commission's method asserts that Alaska's op-
erating loss "saved" $500 of federal tax. Midland is 
assigned what the Commission says is a proper portion 
of the "savings." The Commission seeks to lay hold upon 
this Alaska item and to move it to Utah even though 
it reflects business done solely in Alaska. The Commis-
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sion would not, it may be observed, seek to move any of 
the Alaska operating loss to Utah for purposes of measur-
ing Midland's franchise tax income. The fact of Alaska's 
federal tax refund is ignored. 
POINT 1. 
THE DEDUCTIONS TAKEN BY MIDLAND AND 
UTAH FOR FEDERAL TAXES PAID ARE DIRECT-
LY AND EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 
59-13-7, UCA 1953. 
The Tax Commission response to Midland's first 
point appears in Point III of its brief, p. 20, et seq). 
The applicable statute, Sec. 59-13-7(3), authorizes 
the franchise taxpayer to deduct "taxes paid or ac-
crued." As concerns the application of such a statute to 
cases like this, Midland cited three cases directly support-
ing its position, Cities Service Gas Co. v. McDonald, 204 
Kan. 705, 466 P2d 277 (1970); Northern Natural Gas 
Processing Co. v. McCoy, 197 Kan. 740, 241 P2d 190 
(1967); and Massey-Ferguson Credit Corporation v. 
Briggs, (Decision No. 48, Iowa Tax Board, 7/8/74). The 
Commission's response is limited to the observation (p. 
22) that by subsequent legislation, "The Kansas legisla-
ture effectively overruled the Cities Service case." This 
is exactly Midland's point. The Utah statute authorizes 
the deduction Midland took. If the law of Utah is to be 
altered, the legislature is the appropriate agent of gov-
ernment to effect the change. 
There is no authority contrary to Midland's position. 
The case relied upon by the Commission, Trunkline Gas 
Co. v. Collector of Revenue (La. App. 1965), 182 So2d 
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674, is not in point. The Commission's description of the 
holding is not correct. The Commission omits any men-
tion of the statute, R.S. 47:241, and regulation, ITR 
55.2, on which the decision is based. The statute directs 
an apportionment of the federal income tax deduction 
and explicitly empowers the Collector to make rules and 
regulations to do so. The Kansas court declined to follow 
Trunkline, as Kansas had no such statute and no such 
regulation. The Utah situation is the same as that in 
Kansas. 
Moreover, the Lousiana allocation method upheld in 
the Trunkline decision differs fundamentally from that 
sought to be imposed here by the Utah Commission. The 
Louisiana regulation does not ignore the tax refund pay-
ments, as the Utah Commission would seek to do; instead, 
such payments are taken into account in the computation. 
The last sentence of the governing regulation, as quoted 
in the decision (182 So.2d, at 678), so provides.1 To be 
accurate about the matter, Trunkline is contrary to the 
position taken by the Utah Commission. 
The Commission's brief attempts a showing (pp. 15, 
19), that "[substantial benefits were given the members 
of the consolidated group by the filing of Continental's 
consolidated federal return." Except for the matter of 
the offsetting of losses against gains, none of these had 
been mentioned in the Commission's findings. The Com-
i 'To r this purpose, the amount of Federal income tax paid by a cor-
poration shall be deemed to be the sum of payments it makes to the Federal 
Government and payments it makes to any other corporation of the consoli-
dated group in discharge of the tax obligation arising from the consolida-
tion, minus the sum of any payments it receives from the Federal Govern-
ment and the sum of any payments it receives from any other corporation 
in the consolidated group in discharge of the tax obligation arising from the 
consolidation." 
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mission's theory of "benefits" is accordingly discussed in 
Point 3 of this brief. 
POINT 2(a) 
THE DECISION OF THE TAX COMMISSION IS 
ERRONEOUS INSOFAR AS IT IS BASED UPON 
AN ALLOCATION PURPORTEDLY MADE UNDER 
SECTION 59-13-17. 
The statute referred to in the heading authorizes the 
Commission to apportion or allocate income or deduc-
tions among affiliated corporations, whether or not they 
do business in Utah, if the Commission determines that 
such an allocation is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes 
or clearly to reflect income. 
Midland's first brief argued that the Commission did 
not make the factual determination necessary to the ap-
plication of the statute. The Commission response (p. 14) 
is to claim that such a determination was made in Find-
ing of Fact No. 14 by the recital that unless the audit 
deficiency were sustained, it ". . . would cost the State 
of Utah revenue." It is submitted that a mention of this 
simplistic truism is not a "determination" of the kind 
intended by Sec. 59-13-17. The Commission did not make 
the factual determination necessary to call the statute 
into operation nor did it even purport to do so. Given the 
record, as a matter of law it could not. 
The Tax Commission brief also suggests (p. 10) that 
Sec. 59-13-17 is a statutory delegation of Commission 
power to promulgate Regulation 13. That problem is 
discussed in Point 2(c) below. 
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POINT 2(b) 
THE DECISION OF THE TAX COMMISSION IS 
ERRONEOUS INSOFAR AS IT IS BASED ON THE 
KENNECOTT CASE. 
The Commission's discussion of the Kennecott case 
(Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 27 U2d 119, 493 P2d 632 (1972)) goes basically 
to its claim that the decision upholds Regulation 13. This 
idea is discussed in Point 2(c). 
It is sufficient for the present point of the argument 
to note the error of the Commission's statement (p. 18) 
that: "The exact same method of apportioning and allo-
cating the Federal income tax deduction in the Kennecott 
case which was approved by this Court was applied in 
the present situation to taxpayers." By the necessities of 
the situation, the Commission cannot be right about that. 
The factual differences between the two cases are so 
marked that the apportioning procedures were necessar-
ily very different. From the standpoint of a judicial prece-
dent, Kennecott does not support the Commission argu-
ment. 
POINT 2(c) 
THE DECISION OF THE TAX COMMISSION IS 
ERRONEOUS INSOFAR AS IT IS BASED UPON 
REGULATION 13. 
Most of the Commission's brief is given over to an 
effort to save Regulation 13, and to justify its applica-
tion to Midland during tax years 1965 through 1970. 
Two legal obstacles face the Commission in this ef-
fort: First, as in effect during those tax years the regu-
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lation did not by its own terms apply to a case of this 
kind. Second, the Commission lacks power to make it 
applicable, by amendment or construction. 
Regulation 13 was revised, after Midland's hearing, 
by the addition of the new paragraph shown in the initial 
brief. That the old regulation did not apply appears 
clearly from a reading of sections relied upon by the 
Commission in its Findings.2 Those address subjects 
wholly different from what is involved in this case. The 
Commission's re-write of Regulation 13, effective for 
1973 and tax years thereafter, shows the correctness of 
Midland's reading of the old regulation. The Commis-
sion's response (p. 16) to this argument is that it bears 
similarity to the "subsequent repairs" evidentiary rule 
(Rule 51, Rules of Evidence, which says that evidence 
of subsequent repair measures is not admissable to prove 
prior culpability or negligence). The assumed analogy 
does not exist. It is obvious that that Commission revised 
2 The Commission's Finding of Fact No. 12 reads in full as follows: 
"12. Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Regulation 13 provides: 
Deductible Federal Income Taxes and Refunds Thereof — Allocation 
of Federal Income Taxes. 1. Federal Tax Deductions to be Reduced by 
Credits. The amount of federal income tax which may be deducted against 
total corporate income for Utah income or franchise tax purposes is the 
amount of the federal tax after all credits such as investment tax credits 
(current and carryover), foreign tax credits, etc., have been deducted. 
2. Cash Basis Taxpayer, (a) In the case of a taxpayer reporting on 
the cash basis, the amount of federal income taxes actually paid during the 
taxable period is allowable as a deduction, whether such taxes represent 
the preceding year's tax or additional tax for prior years. Refunds of 
federal taxes must be reported as income in the year received or offset 
against payments made in that year and the net amount only of the 
payments deducted. 
3. Accrual Basis Taxpayer, (a) In the case of an accrual basis tax-
payer, the amount of federal income tax to be allowed as a deduction in 
arriving at the total corporate net income for Utah franchise tax purposes 
is normally limited to the amount of the actual federal income tax liability 
in connection with its federal return for the same period." 
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Regulation 13 to make it say what it had not said before 
the revision. 
Viewed strictly, it may be enough to decide this case, 
so far as concerns Regulation 13, to conclude that the 
old regulation, effective during the tax years at issue, 
does not apply. On this view, Midland's further showing 
that the Commission has no authority to make the 1973 
amendment would be superfluous. 
This argument is advanced, however, in response to 
the Commission's position that the 1973 addition only 
restates what the regulation always said. 
The Commission asserts power to make the new regu-
lation on a number of theories: 
(a) General power is said to be delegated in Art. 
XIII, §11 of the Constitution, and by Section 59-5-46. 
These delegate only as to procedural matters. 
(b) The Commission claims authority in Section 59-
13-23(2). That statute empowers the Commission to 
make substantive regulations governing affiliated groups 
which file consolidated returns for Utah corporation 
franchise tax purposes, A regulation based thereon has 
valid authority for consolidated Utah return matters, 
but it cannot apply here. Midland did not file a Utah 
consolidated return. 
(c) The Commission asserts that regulation-making 
power comes from the allocation authority granted by 
Section 59-13-17 governing the allocation of income de-
ductions between several corporations controlled by the 
same interests. By its own provisions, the statute does 
not operate until after the Commission ". . . determines 
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that such distribution, apportionment or allocation is 
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly 
to reflect the income of such corporations." No such claim 
was made here, no evidence to that effect was adduced 
and no related findings made. That statute provides for 
the examination of claimed distortions and provides the 
state a remedy; it does not grant or imply a power to 
legislate. 
(d) The Commission asserts that the Kennecott case 
holds that Regulation 13 is valid and that it applies to 
situations like Midland's. Kennecott does not so hold. 
That case involved a multi-state group of companies 
reporting Utah income and non-Utah income, and filing 
a consolidated corporation franchise tax return with the 
Commission for Utah tax purposes. This court stated that 
the Kennecott consolidated group "bound" its members 
to the Utah regulations (493 P2d, at 636) by filing a 
Utah consolidated return. The case does not support any 
inference that it is within the Commission's statutory 
power to write or re-write a new provision into Regula-
ton 13 applicable to Midland which did not so file. 
Midland's brief made the point that the pattern of 
the tax statutes, which extend substantive rule-making 
power in some tax areas, and withhhold it in others 
(including the taxes-paid deduction area), shows the 
absence of delegated authority in the case of Rule 13. 
The Commission's response (p. 14) assumes that Mid-
land has made an expressio unius argument, and claims 
that for some reason that rule is not valid in tax mat-
ters. Midland's point is more fundamental. The applica-
ble rule is a matter of basic governmental law. This 
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Court said in Basin Flying Service v. Public Service Com-
mission, .... U , 531 P2d 1303 (1975), in connection 
with powers of the Public Service Commission, that 
(531 P2d 1303, at 1305): 
In harmony with this it is well established that 
a regulatory body such as the Public Service Com-
mission, which is created by and derives its powers 
and duties from statute, has no inherent regula-
tory powers, but only those which are expressly 
granted, or which are clearly implied as necessary 
to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities 
imposed upon it [citations omitted]. 
That rule applies here with like force. 
POINT 3 
THE TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY MATTERS NEWLY RAISED HERE. 
This part of Midland's brief discusses theories and 
arguments that were neither presented to the Commis-
sion nor reflected in its findings and conclusions, but 
are urged here for the first time. 
(a) At pages 16-17 of its brief, and at page 19, the 
Commission quotes from, and now relies upon, Sec. 4 of 
Regulation 13. 
Sec. 4 concerns itself with assignments of the federal 
income tax deduction among the various items or divi-
sions of a taxpayer. The references are to "items" and 
"divisions" of one taxpayer's overall business and is ap-
plicable to multi-state operations of that business. There 
is no reference to separate but affiliated corporations, 
and thus in the present case there is no subject matter 
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to which Sec. 4 can apply. The Commission was right 
the first time to omit Sec. 4, and this afterthought does 
not help its position. 
(b) The Commission's brief attempts a showing (p. 
15) that "[substantial benefits were given the parent 
corporation and each member of the consolidated group" 
by the filing of a consolidated federal return, mentioning 
some ten listed in 7 CCH, Standard Federal Tax Report-
er, ^4903.17. Another purported benefit is mentioned on 
p. 19: ". . . taxes are reduced by moving in and out of 
different percentage tax brackets, in general." 
The Commission's findings refer only to one such 
claimed benefit. Finding of Fact 6 mentions an assumed 
benefit in the offsetting of operational losses against 
profits. (In the example given in the statement of facts 
of this brief, this would be the offsetting of the Alaska 
loss against the incomes of Midland and Montana.) 
That is the "benefit" on which the Commission based 
its decision. The other matters are merely afterthoughts, 
not considered at the time the decision appealed from 
was made. 
Moreover, the point is immaterial. The federal tax 
laws levy the tax provided for; the local taxing authori-
ties make other levies; the franchise tax law provides that 
all these may be deducted. If some "benefit" in the 
other taxes lessens their impact, then the franchise taxes-
paid deduction is lessened and the franchise tax increases. 
The Commission's list of assumed benefits includes 
the claim (p. 19) that on a consolidated return "taxes 
are reduced by moving in and out of different percent-
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age tax brackets." The Commission was speaking only 
generally, as the record and testimony show that no such 
factor is or could be present in this case (Tr. 57-58). 
In its Point II (p. 18) the Commission lists the four 
methods provided in federal regulations for the compu-
tation of a consolidated return: (1) a taxable income 
method; (2) a separate return method; (3) a tax in-
crease allocation method; and (4) discretionary methods. 
The basic fact in this case is that Midland's federal 
return was computed on the separate-return basis. The 
federal closing agreement with the IRS so provides, and 
that method is also imposed by the regulatory commis-
sions. The further basic fact is that the separate-return 
method forecloses the benefits the Commission now 
brings up. 
(c) The Tax Commission brief suggests seven policy 
reasons for its position, which are said to be "determina-
tive." So far as these are accurately labeled "policy rea-
sons" they are of course presented in the wrong forum. 
So far as they constitute argumentation they are replied 
to below, in the order appearing in the Commission's 
brief (pp. 23-24). 
(1) It is said that unless the Commission prevails, 
the State is "deprived of vital revenues based on fed-
eral tax loopholes" that "large, corporate taxpayers" may 
take advantage of by reason of their affiliations with 
out-of-state interests, but of which "local, smaller com-
petitors" may not take advantage. 
The rhetoric need not be responded to. That aside, 
the point is empty of real content. No federal loophole 
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was taken advantage of by Midland, as the record dem-
onstrates. As concerns the notion that Midland is given 
advantage over smaller competitors, it can be noted that 
Midland is a regulated monoply and is without a com-
petitor of any size; apart from that, not many telephone 
companies are more "local" than Midland, or "smaller." 
(2) We are told by the Commission that it is the 
Utah Legislature which should determine who is entitled 
to a greater reduction in their taxable income, and that 
it is the legislature which should set the guidelines if 
affiliated companies are to get tax relief. 
Midland would agree with this. 
(3) The Commission states that it lacks authority or 
ability to audit corporations not doing business in Utah 
to determine whether the amount contributed by the 
Utah taxpayer was reasonable in light of the total fed-
eral tax liability. 
The argument is incorrect. Section 59-13-17 provides 
otherwise and this case demonstrates otherwise. 
(4) The Commission complains that the Utah taxing 
authorities have no control over the parent corporation 
to compel it to assess its subsidiaries only in an amount 
equal to their tax liability. 
It is accurate to say that the Commission has no such 
control or power of compulsion. Nor should it. If what 
is meant is that the Commission may not, for franchise 
tax purposes, disallow an excessive "assessment," then the 
statement is simply wrong. 
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(5) We are told that the State of Utah should not 
be required to subsidize the elimination of inter-company 
profits and transactions between affiliated groups by 
granting relief from Utah taxes. 
This platitude has nothing to do with the present case. 
If it is the Commission's notion that Midland or 
Continental have found a way to do away with federal 
taxes on inter-company transactions, then the Commis-
sion is wrong. The treatment of profits upon Continen-
tal's inter-company transactions, for federal income tax 
purposes, was shown the Commission and is before the 
Court as reflected in testimony and in the closing agree-
ment with the Internal Revenue Service (Exhibit 16). 
That agreement does not "eliminate" the profit or the 
tax on these transactions but defers them (or takes ac-
count of them in increments) over the life of the plant 
item. As the Midland witness stated, the profit is attrib-
uted to the operating utility. The benefit obtained by 
deferring the tax is that the borrowing costs of the utili-
ties are lessened. This of course raises income, and this 
raises the franchise tax. The Commission is arguing with 
itself. 
(6) The Commission tells us that the corporation 
franchise tax is upon the privilege of exercising a fran-
chise with all corporate benefits within the state, based 
upon the percentage of taxable income, and that the 
reduction of the franchise fee necessarily discriminates 
against intra-state domestic corporations. 
The short answer is that no "reduction" is present. 
Midland's deduction for federal taxes paid was the same 
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as it would have been if no federal consolidated return 
had been filed. The Commission has assumed its answer 
before commencing any analysis of the problem. Indeed, 
it is the Commission which seeks to bring in outside fac-
tors to vary Midland's taxable Utah income because of 
occurrences outside this state. 
(7) As a final item, the Commission argues that 
"Adoption of appellant's recommendation necessarily 
ties the State of Utah to everchanging Federal tax regu-
lations in the area of consolidated returns and may result 
in undesirable revenue loss and other adverse effects to 
the State of Utah should the government change its fed-
ral tax laws for fiscal or other reasons. Again, local 
regulations are pushed back up to a federal level." 
The argument is a legislative argument. It may be 
observed that during all of the history of the Utah in-
come tax, upon persons and upon corporations, we have 
all been accustomed to deducting the taxes levied by 
other tax-laying authorities. If the tax collector wishes 
this fundamental pattern changed, it has chosen the 
wrong forum in which to make the effort. 
Midland cannot forebear the observation that the 
Commission's arguments and its "policy" presentation 
bespeak a preoccupation with matters other than the 
one before the Court. Midland's case is its own 
case. Midland is a taxpayer which, because of the 
separate-company accounting method laid out for it and 
because of its intensely regulated way of life as a public 
utility, does not present a case of the kind the Commis-
sion affects to be concerned about. It is time for a deei-
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sion of the Court that the Commission is and has been 
wrong about this case, on its merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Tax Commission Decision No. 288 is incorrect and 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John W. Horsley 
O. Wood Moyle III 
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